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The state of Indian public finances appears perilous. In recent years the
public sector financial deficit has been rising in real terms and as a proportion
of GNP. The same is true for the primary or noninterest deficit. The real values
of the public debt and the public debt—GNP ratio are rising sharply. Even the
discounted public debt, that is the present value of the public debt (discounted to
some common base year), is rising steadily. The question naturally arises as to
whether this pattern of debt and deficits is sustainable.
There are four reasons why a rising public debt burden may be of concern. The
first of these is financial crowding out. If there is no debt neutrality, the
substitution of borrowing for current taxes (even lump—sum) on labor income will
tend to raise private consumption. In an economy with full utilization of
resources this will lead either to the displacement of private investment and
other interest—sensitive forms of private spending or to an increase in the
deficit on the current account of the balance of payments. This aspect of public
debt and deficits will not be addressed in what follows.
The second reason relates to tax smoothing. Even if there is "first—order"
debt neutrality, the option of running budget deficits or surpluses may be
valuableif there are no lump—sum, nondistortionary tax—transfer schemes
available. Temporary deficits and surpluses permit changes in the time profile of
the distortionary (deadweight) losses (or collection costs) associated with
nonlump—sumtaxes and transfers.Under rather restrictive separability and2
homogeneity assumptions, a tax smoothing prescription emerges (see e.g. Barro
[1979]): the ratio of distortionary tax receipts to the tax base is expected to be
constant over time.If there is no first—order debt neutrality, financial
crowding out concerns may prevent otherwise desirable tax smoothing. For reasons
of space this issue too is not considered further in what follows.
The third concern, which is addressed in this paper, relates to the eventual
monetization of persistent deficits and thus to their potential inflationary
consequences. The last concern is the possibility of insolvency or bankruptcy of
the national Exchequer. This too will be dealt with in what follows.
The question of how to evaluate the sustainability of a government's fiscal
financial strategy has been explored intensively in recent years (see e.g. Buiter
[1983a, b; 1985; 1989a, b] ,Anandand van Wijnbergen [1989] ,Hamiltonand Flavin
[1986] ,Grilli[1989] and Wilcox [1989]).
After presenting a brief review of some of the key facts concerning recent
budgetary developments in Section 2, we turn in Section 3 to a systematic analysis
of whether the current and recent behavior of key budgetary and related time series
is sustainable. Since our conclusion is that a continuation of current patterns
would eventually lead to insolvency of the Exchequer, we turn in Section 4 to the
consideration of alternative policy options to avoid insolvency. These fall into
three categories: first policies aimed at ensuring larger primary surpluses or
smaller primary deficits; second policies to reduce the interest cost of
borrowing; and third increased recourse to seigniorage or the inflation tax. Our
main conclusions are summarized in Section 5.
2. SOlE FACTS CONCEKNThC DEBT, DEFICITS AND SEIGNIORACE
Our datacover the period 1970/71 to 1986/87. The most striking fact is the
dramatic increase in the total (internal and external) public debt—GNP ratio since
1980/81, from 32.8 percent in that year to 52.4 percent in 1986/87—an average3
annualincrease in the ratio of 3.3 percentage points. There is no reason to
believe that there has been a significant downturn in the ratio since then, or even
that the rate of increase has been reduced markedly. Figure 1 and Table 1 show this
striking pattern quite clearly.
Our total public debt figure (NTD) covers both internal (or domestic) and
external (or foreign) debt, and subtracts official foreign exchange reserves. The
domestic subtotal includes domestic private sector holdings of central government
debt (CDD), state government debt (SDD) and public enterprise debt (PDD).
Intrapublic sector assets and liabilities are netted out. It is important that the
liabilities of public enterprises (and of the "holding companies" created in the
mid seventies) be included in the public debt total, since ultimately these
liabilities are de facto or de jure the responsibility of the state or central
Treasuries. The banking sector, other than the Reserve Bank, was excluded from our
definition of the public sector despite its being publicly owned. The
decomposition of the domestic public debt is given in Table 2. Note that it is the
domestic debt that accounts for most of the increase in total government
indebtedness.
The foreign debt (TFD) figures in Table 3 include public and publicly
guaranteed long—term debt (as defined and given in the World Bank's World Debt
Tables), use of lIP credit, and an estimate of public and publicly guaranteed
short—termdebt. Foreign exchange reserves 1are subtracted from TFD to get net
foreigndebt(NTFD).
Table 4 shows that the public sector deficit as a proportion of GNP has been
rising since 1973/4 with the exception of two dips in 1977/8 and 1981/2. The
primary (noninterest) deficit as a proportion of GNP shows a similar pattern, more
than doubling between 1973/4 and 1986/7 to 9.8 percent. Interest payments reached
4.1 percent of GNP in 1986/7. Use of seigniorage has been nonnegligible, averaging4
2.4 percent of GNP over the last five years of our sample. Table 5 gives the tine
series for GNP growth, inflation, exchange rate depreciation and interest rates.
Figures for the discounted debt, discounted primary deficit and discounted
seigniorage—iihich are key ingredients in our solvency tests—are given in Table
6 and Figure 2.
3. IS THERE A THREAT TO THE SOLVENCYOF THE PtTBLIC SECTOR?
Akeyquestion when evaluating the fiscal options open to the Indian
government is whether a continuation of past and present policies is consistent
with government solvency. To answer this question we start from the consolidated
public sector budget identity given in equation (3.1). It consolidates general
government (central, state and local) with the public enterprise sector and the
central bank.
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I is the nominal stock of base money, B thestockof domestic currency denominated
*
publicdebt, B the stock of foreign currency denominated public debt, F the stock
of foreign exchange reserves, A' the public sector capital stock valued at current
reproduction cost, C government consumption, A public sector gross domestic
*
capitalformation, met current revenue, the domestic nominal interest rate,
the foreign nominal interest rate, V the foreign exchange rate, P the domestic
price level and p the cash rate of return on public sector capital.
For simplicity our analysis is cast in ternis of one—period public debt, and
the interest rate on international reserves is assumed to be the same as that paid
*-**
onforeign debt, but these simplifications are unimportant. Let B B —Fbe net
official foreign debt.5
It is sometimes helpful (but without behavioral significance) to rewrite
this identity in terms of the behavior over time of stocks and flows per unit of
GDP. This yields
* (1+ *(1+i_1)(1+




Lower—casestocks and flows are the corresponding upper—case quantities expressed
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V denotes real output.
ii
We shall refer to +a—rt —p_1k_1
a as the primary public sector
deficit per unit of GDP. It is the conventionally measured consolidated public
sector deficit net of any interest payments or interest income. Total public debt
as a fraction of GDP will be denoted d a b +b*. , theincrease in the nominal
stock of base money as a fraction of GDP will be referred to as seign.iorage.
Equation (3.2) can be rewritten as (3.3). 7 is the proportional depreciation rate
*
ofthe real exchange rate, r the domestic real interest rate, r the foreign real
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Solving(3.4) recursively forward in time and, letting E denote the






, = 1be the discount factor from period zero to
j=0
period Ui .Equation(3.5) can be rewritten as
(3.5') = [t+i+i
+ ÷ tim t+1÷i
The terminal condition we impose on (3.5') to obtain the government solvency
constraint or present value budget constraint is
(3.6) 0
Z-ri-i
In what follows we shall in fact assume that (3.6) holds with strict equality
i.e. "supersolvency" is not considered. —-—q_1÷d÷1
is the present discounted
qj_j
value at time t of government debt in period Ui .Equation(3.6) states that the
expectation, at t ,ofthe present value of future public debt goes to zero in the
limit. It makes no difference of course whether we express (3.6) interms of the
debt—GOP ratio and real interest rates net of real growth rates; in terms of real
debt and real interest rates; in terms of debt measured in home currency and
nominal interest rates in terms of home currency; or in terms of debt measured in
terms of foreign currency and nominal interest rates in terms of foreign currency.
When (3.6) holds (with equality), equation (3.5') becomes the familiar











where q_1d ,thepresent value at time zero of public debt at time i ,
thepresent value at time zero of the primary deficit at time t+1+i
and ,thepresent value at time zero of seigniorage at time
The condition in (3.6) (holding with equality) can be rewritten as
(3.6') 1imED =0
2-IT
Theoriginal budget identity in (3.4) can be rewritten as
(3.4') +A—S
THElEANING OF THE SOLVENCY CONSTRAINT
Inafinite horizon economy with a finite terminal date T,thesolvency
constraintis the requirement that public debt in the last period be nonpositive
i.e.
(3.8) b1￿0.
In an infinite horizon economy that is not dynamically inefficient, the
natural analogue of (3.8) is (3.6) or (3.6'). This ensures that in the infinite
horizon economy—as in the finite horizon economy—the existing debt ultimately
is serviced (note not paid off) by current and future primary surpluses or by
current and future seigniorage.
If the economy is dynamically inefficient, which will be the case if the
interest rate is below the growth rate forever (rg <forall ),thereis no
convincing case for requiring (3.6) or (3.6') to hold. Ponzi games can be viable
indefinitely in a dynamically inefficient system: the government can, each
period, pay the interest on its existing debt by further borrowing. Ye assume in
what follows that while the interest rate can be below the growth rate for extended
finite periods of time, the Indian economy is not dynamically inefficient, and8
that there are no social free lunches to be earned by increasing the public debt
(see also Abel et al. [1989]).






With a positive initial stock of debt (d1 > 0) equation (3.9) is satisfied
only if ultimately the debt is expected to grow at a rate less than the interest
rate
1-÷j÷1c i •1 Sinced1÷31 1- 1+ r1+5+
,itis
1 + 1+5 1+5 1 + (1+
clearthat solvency requires, eventually, positive values for —, thesum of
seigniorage and the augmented primary surplus. This is only a necessary
condition, of course. The flows of seigniorage and primary surpluses should
satisfy (3.7) or (3.7').
To prevent the solvency requirement (3.6) or (3.7) from being satisfied
trivially we must purge market values and discount rates of the influences of
actual default and of the market's assessment of the risk of future default. The
discount rates used to obtain the discounted public debt series used in the
solvency tests should therefore be net of any risk premiums reflecting the
market's perception of the possibility of default. Similarly, the value of the
debt used in the solvency tests should be gross of any discount due to default risk.
When the market value of the debt is endogenous and potentially variable even
without any default risk (as will e.g. be the case with long—term fixed interest
debt), it may not be empirically simple to assess the influence of market
perceptions of default risk on the pricing of the debt. When the debt has a fixed
nominal market value in the absence of default risk there is of course no empirical9
problem. We assume in what follows that in our sample the market does not give any
weight to the possibility of default on the Indian public debt.
Note that solvency is a very weak criterion with which to evaluate the
sustainability of fiscal and financial policy. A government can be solvent even
though its real debt and even its debt relative to GDP or GNP grows without bound.
If the long—run growth rate of the debt—GOP ratio while positive is less than the
long—run value of r i.e. less than the excess of the interest rate over the growth
rate in the long run, then eventually unbounded debt—GDP ratios can still be
consistent with solvency.
The reason why this remarkable fiscal high wire act may be possible is that
our approach to solvency thus far has ignored the growing excess burden associated
with ever higher distortionary taxes and the rising real resource cost of
extracting an ever rising tax burden from the private sector.
Steady growth in the debt—GOP ratio and even an eventually unbounded
debt—GOP ratio may be consistent with continued debt service and solvency because
the government is (implicitly) assumed to be able to tax away in lump—sum fashion
(i.e. without distortions or collection and enforcement costs) any amount up to
the sum of GOP plus the interest it pays on the public debt.2 Since the "tax base"
is not GOP alone but GOP plus debt interest, there is nothing logically
inconsistent about debt service outstripping GOP, even by indefinitely increasing
amounts.
While this point is logically correct, its practical relevance is likely to
be slight.If dead weight losses, excess burdens or collection costs are an
increasing and strictly convex function of the real tax take or of the tax—GOP
ratio, then only finite debt—GOP ratios are feasible.
While our weak solvency criterion only implies that discounted debt
cannot have a positive stochastic or deterministic trend, a stricter and very10
plausible practical solvency criterion in addition states that the undiscounted
debt—GDP ratio d cannot have a positive stochastic or deterministic trend.
Under neither solvency criterion is it necessary for the public sector ever
to run conventionally measured public sector financial surpluses even if the
initial debt is positive.
Consider the three budget surplus measures given below.
The conventional financial surplus (CFS):
(3.lOa) CFSaT+pK_[C+A]_[i+ip'B]
The operational financial surplus ((IFS):
(3.lOb) hiSs T+pt— [c+ A]()1Jn)
+j)(j+El1V *
+ r)(1 +n)'jF'
The primary financial surplus (PFS):
(3.lOc) PiSsT+pK_[C+A]
Neither under the weak solvency criterion nor under the practical solvency
criterion is it necessary for a government with a positive stock of public debt and
r >never to run conventional financial surpluses. It may choose to do so. It may
be desirable or even optimal to do so, permanently or temporarily, but it is not
required for solvency. -
Ignoringseigniorage our practical solvency criterion (but not the weak
solvency criterion) implies that at some point positive operational financial
surpluses are required. If seigniorage is allowed for, the practical solvency
criterion need not imply the eventual necessity of operational (or
asset—revaluation and real—growth—corrected) financialsurpluses.
Vithpositivedebt and r —n,theweak solvency criterion and a foriiori the
practicalsolvency criterion require, if seigniorage is ignored, that primary11
surpluses be achieved at some point. Again, recourse to seigniorage could reverse
this conclusion.
TESTING FOR SOLVENCY
Theonly testable implication of the weak solvency requirement is equation
(3.6) or (3.6'): the unconditional expectation of the discounted public debt
should be zero (or nonpositive).
Since we do not have a structural model of the economic and political
processes governing the evolution of the Indian public debt, we are restricted to a
rather mechanical "data description" which aims to answer the following questions:
1. Is there a stable (reduced form) data generating process (DGP) that describes
the behavior of the discounted public debt? 2.Is this DCP (covariance)
stationary? 3. If it is covariance stationary, is its unconditional mean equal to
zero?
If the DGP is not covariance stationary, then its unconditional expectation
will be (almost surely) nonzero. Establishing nonstationarity would therefore
imply that the policies pursued during the sample period would, if they were
adhered to into the indefinite future, either imply supersolvency or ultimate
insolvency of the government. Ye can dispose easily of the supersolvency
possibility. The initial debt is certainly positive, and the case of
characteristic roots less than —1canbe ruled out. Note that a finding of a
nonstationary DGP does not mean that there will be government insolvency; only
that in the absence of policy or other changes that render the DGP stationary,
bankruptcy of the Treasury will result. In Section 4 we consider some of the policy
options that would eliminate the specter of insolvency. Ex post the solvency
constraint will be satisfied either through changes in the paths of the augmented
primarysurplus and of seigniorage or by default i.e. write downs in the value of
the outstanding debt. Ouranalysis also is silent on the important issue as to when12
and how the threat of insolvency (given unchanged policies) will either compel
changes in the process governing primary surpluses and seigniorage or result in de
facto or de jure repudiation of (part of) the debt.
If the DGP is covariance stationary, its unconditional mean will be zero if
the univariate representation of the stochastic process governing it is strictly
indeterministic. If the process has a deterministic component, its unconditional
mean may of course by nonzero even if the process is stationary.
What are the testable implications of the solvency constraint for the sum of
the augmented primary surplus —Se and seigniorage t ? Let +, and
Since if tbe solvency constraint is satisfied we have
(3.11) =
itfollows that stationarity of I ,thepresent discounted value of seigniorage
plus augmented primary surplus, is necessary but not sufficient for solvency. The
infinite sum of stationary stochastic processes may be nonstationary. If that
were the case for {I} ,then would be nonstationary and solvency would fail.
Even if the expectation of the infinite sum of future is stationary, it need
not equal P and again solvency would fail. An example of such a process for is
given in Wilcox [1989] whose approach is followed closely in this section of our
paper.
Let I =alt_i
+withat <I ,and ,whitenoise. This implies
(3.12) =ia't
Can it be true that P =ff alt?If this were the case, we would have
a't
From (3.4') however we know that D2—D1 't13
Therefore the first—order stationary autoregressive process for the discounted
sum of seigniorage and the augmented primary surplus is inconsistent with
solvency.
We could estimate the stochastic process governing I,calculate
and test whether this equaled D .Anequivalent but slightly more
direct method is to estimate the stochastic process governing B and to test
whether IimEPf=0.Hamiltonand Flavin [1986] pioneered these tests of the
discounted debt. Wilcox [1989] and Grilli [1989] extended their approach. Our
analysis involves a statistical generalization of Wilcox's approach using
techniques developed by Phillips and Perron [1988].
Wilcox assumes that can be represented by the following potentially
multivariate 41114process:
(3.13) [1_p(L] [1 L)dZa] =[1_0L)]eg
p(L) is a pth order polynomial, 9(L) is a qthorderpolynomial, Z is a random
vector whose first element is 9g is a vector of constants, and is a vector
white noise process. (1— LZ4 is a covariance—stationary series i.e. the series
I is integrated of order d .Weassume that (I—p(L)) and (I— 0(L)) have all their
roots outside the unit circle. Since p(L) and 0(L) are thus assumed to satisfy the




(3.15) (L) = =[(I-0(L)][(I_p(L)].14
Note that the order of the autoregressive process in (3.14) and (3.15) is
potentially infinite.This representation is operational only if it can be
approximated by a finite—order autoregressive process. a0 is the unconditional
expectation of (I_L)dZ
The solvency tests of Wilcox's statistical model in (3.15) consist of two
parts, of which only the first may be necessary. First test whether Z is
stationary. By assumption (I —iyZ2
is stationary. So Z is stationary if the
order of integration d is less than .Ina univariate representation of (3.14)
with as the only random variable, a finding that the process governing Pt has a
unit root (is integrated of order 1) would imply that the P process is
inconsistent with government solvency.A finding that d <i.e.that Z is
stationary can still be consistent with insolvency provided the first element of
a0 is nonzero. If we permit supersolvency (timED+ <0)as well as solvency (tim
ZT
= 0)then nonstationary processes involving negative values only of J1
would be permissible. A stationary process for with the first element of a0
negative would also be consistent with (super)solvency. Neither of these two
supersolvency cases is a practical possibility for the Indian economy, and they
are indeed rejected by the data. If P is stationary, the second test therefore is
whether the first element of a0 is zero.
IS THE INDIANDISCOUNTED PUBLIC DEBT STATIONARY?
Our empirical testsof the stationarity of the Indian public debt are
complicatedby two problems. First our annual time series is short indeed: 17
annualobservations from fiscal year 1970/71 to fiscal year 1986/87. Limited
degrees of freedom means low power for all our tests. Second, there are problems
about the choice of interest rate to use for discounting the debt. If expected
holding period rates of return (interest coupon payments plus capital gains per15
Rupee invested) were the same for all debt instruments regardless of maturity,
currencydenomination or other characteristics, there would be no problems as the
holding period rate of return onany debtinstrument could be used.
Thisassumption of "uncovered interest parity" for all debt instruments
fails heroically in tests involving industrial country financial claims. We
shouldcertainly not expect it to be valid for the case of Indiawhere domestic
financial markets are characterized by frequent and prolonged nonprice rationing.
To make our findings as robust as possible under the circumstances, we
perform four versions of the stationarity tests—two involving domestic Rupee
interest rates and two involving dollar interest rates.
Our first domestic rate is a government borrowing rate (the Government Bond
Yield) while the second is a quasigovernment lending rate—the Advance
Rate—which relates to the State Bank of India's prime lending rate which
regulates all interest rates for the various categories and classes of advances
granted by the Bank. The tests involving the Advance Rate tilt the odds towards
rejectingnonstationarity as it exceeds sometimes by a wide margin the rate
actually paid by the government on its outstanding liabilities (see Table 5).
The two dollar interest rates are the "All Creditors" rate from the World
Bank World Debt Tables and the "Official Creditors" rate from the same source.
With all four interest rates our conclusion is the same. Discounted public
debt is nonstationary: the process characterizing discounted public debt over our
samplehasa unit root in each case. The pattern of behavior that produces the
public debt process is therefore not sustainable.
In his empirical work Wilcox [1989] implements the univariate3 special case
of equation (3.14) given in (3.16).
(3.16) =
a1t+ +16
The error term is assumed to be i.i.d. Eventual insolvency will occur if
(at least) one of the following conditions holds: 1. The roots of 1 —fl(L)do not
all lie outside the unit circle; 2. a10,thatis there is a deterministic trend
(one expects a positive coefficient i.e. no supersolvency); 3. a0 # 0 ,thatis
even though the D process is stationary, its unconditional expectation is nonzero
(again one expects a1 >0i.e. no supersolvency).
Following Perron and Phillips [1987] we generalize Wilcox's approach to
handle a wider class of stochastic processes for the error term (see also Phillips
[1988], and Phillips and Perron [1988]). Our D equation is:
(3.17) D=a0÷a1i+fiD1+u
The error term can belong to a very wide class of stochastic processes.
{tj}isa weakly stationary sequence of random variables satisfying the following
conditions (see Phillips [1988]): =0; R Iu
fin for some fi >2;
is strong mixing with mixing numbers a which satisfy a — cw. These
conditions allow for many weakly dependent time series and include a broad class of
data generating mechanisms such as finite order liii models under very general
conditions.
The original Dickey—Fuller test for the presence of a unit root was
developed for autoregressive representations of known order and normal i.i.d.
errors (Dickey and Fuller [1979]). The augmented Dickey—Fuller test assumed an
autoregressive representation of known order plus a time trend and normal i.i.d.
errors (Dickey and Fuller [1981]).Said and Dickey [1984] showed that the
Dickey—Puller i—test for a unit root can be applied to 41114 (p ,1,q)models
provided the lag length in the autoregression increases with the sample size T at a1
rate less than 7. The Phillips—Perron tests are nonparametric and can be applied
to a wider class of processes than the three other tests.4
Our null hypothesis for equation (3.17) is that fi= 1
,anda1 =0within a
maintainedhypothesis thatpermitsa nonzero drifta0.Ifwe fail to reject the
null,the discounted public debt is nonstationary which would imply insolvency if
the process persisted into the indefinite future. If the null is rejected but we
finda significantly positive value of a ,thatis a positive deterministic trend,
in the discounted debt series, eventual insolvency still looms. If the null is
rejected and we cannot reject a =0and fi< 1,thenfinding a positive drift
(ao> 0) again would imply eventual insolvency.
The following three test statistics given in Table 7 are derived in Phillips
and Perron [1988] for the null that fi= Iand a1 =0.fl) makesuse of the
standardized and centered least squares estimates of fi. makesuse of the
statistic on fi,(forfi= 1),and Z(+3) is the regression "F—test" of Dickey and
Fuller [1981] for the more general class of error processes in (3.17). These three
statistics have the same limiting distributions for a very wide class of error
processes as the statistics developed by Dickey and Fuller for the case of i.i.d.
errors. The critical values of the three statistics are therefore the same and can
be found in Fuller [1976], and DickeyandFuller[1981]. We also provide the point
estimates andstandarderrors for the three parameters a0, a andfiinTable8.
Withthe exception of the $)teston D1 (debt in Rupees discounted at the
Government's Long Bond Yield), all the evidence points to nonstationarity of the
discounted debt series. The rejection of the (single) unit root hypothesis in the
case of the ($)statisticfor theseries occurs because the discounted debt
appears to be more nonstationary than can be captured by a single unit root.18
Vhen we perform the Phillips—Perron tests for the first difference of D1 ,we
obtain the results given in Table 9. The null of a unit root in the first
difference of B1 cannot be rejected. The hypothesis of nonstationarity for
therefore cannot be challenged.
AREThE INDIAN DEBT—CNP RATIO MU)TIE PRIIARY DFJ'ICIT—CNPRATIOSTATIONARY?
To complement the findings of nonstationarity of the discounted public debt,
Table 10 below presents unit root tests for the debt—GNP ratio NTD/GNP and for the
discounted value of the sum of the augmented primary surplus and seigniorage I.
The point estimates of a0 ,a1
and are given in Table 11.
The debt—GNP ratio is nonstationary. For the discounted sum of seigniorage
and augmented primary surplus, we also fail to reject the null that fi= landa1 =0.
4.POLICY OPTIONS TO AVOID INSOLVENCY











The present value of the "solvency gap" (as a proportion of GDP) is given by
For solvency we require fi 0 or, ruling out the case of supersolvency,
=0.Vithor without solvency, fi follows a martingale
(4.3)
To get some sense of the magnitude of the solvency gap, itishelpful to
calculate the permanent flow equivalent to the stock fi .Let be the long
interest rate net of the real growth rate i.e.19
—1
(4.4) '[±s {
;'7 isthe yield on a consol or perpetuity which pays a constant coupon of one unit
ofoutput eachperiodwhen the single—period discount rates are ,andthe
expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates holds.
a ;d —EJJ
1 + isthe smallest constant
1=05=0
fraction of GD? that—Ut wereto be devoted this period andeveryperiod in the
future to eliminating the solvency gap—would succeed in closing the gap. It is
the"permanent correction" i.e. suxtaine chge iitheaugmented primary surplus
or seigniorage (as a proportiou of GDP that munt be made to the government's






(4.6) 5 =c—+ —
wesee that there are four broad typew ofpoiiqoptions for reducing the augmerted
primary deficit: 1) reductions ingovernment consumption spunding;2) increases
innetcurrent revenues; 3)reducingpublic sector capitalformation and/or
Iscreasinggovernment cash revenues from the stock of public sector capital; and
4) shifting the composition ofthepublic debt between internal and external debt.
Itis important tonatethatthe different spending andrevenueitems that make up 5
cannotbeexpected to bebehaviorally independent of each other either in the short
run orinthe long run.PC
Thefirst tue options for reducing the primary deficit areconceptually
simple and nolitirally difficult. Proposals for widening the current. revenue base
throughan expend ture tax,abroadly based value—added taxor a broadly based
inroac-taxhavebeer made for decades with little to show for it. Vealth taxes such
as al and tar or tar onurban real estate are alsoadministratively feasible but
unpopulararong the politically influential classes. Replacing nonauctioied
imoert quots ItL auctioned quotas or tariffs is another relatively
stnightforward policy measure for raising correct revenues.
Thenet cas} returnon the govenment't capital stock pkneedbear no
relatictwhntsoe"e te the social returns to public sector capital. Cash returns
are releart t: 0: nnoserbecausenn natter hr4esirablethe project it will
rr he financed., and the financial imul loot oue of the project vill infhuenec
itt' iiwerafl fhaecial position of the goeTment including its solvenct.
For mr -fpublic sector capital ttt cash returns are persisteutly
°'erc.riseswithsecular onrrt mc- losses would be one exancle
ter IC :n.firtIor infrastruetqr t!yoeenot vielrevenuerd irectiy
(su tirouj.:. tnil* neher user cbcrge brt abscrbs current resourc.ee ft':
mie"'meero'Te the extent that irIrastrucinre boowtsreal (3NP and thur
t; revennac for:'::YfeiLrdules. its contribution to
retFt: L,irc::4:: $ l priuciele erel
'uynhtttonseu: (Lrc urriJ; It'; ulioue.dfor (ser lur,te:
[CCr],ber: the oressary iaforit'tior.(iacludinçesiimatez of the sffrriOt
rrtw capiai an the tax brru) i rot in practice rerilnbit
ioiinzrhar = — where U C a<Iis thedepeerntiot'rate o
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The debt total emphasized in (4.7) and (4.8) is public debt net of the value
of the public sector capital stock at current reproduction costs. The first term
on the r.h.s. of equation (4.8) is the present value of future seigniorage and the
primary currentaccountor consumption account surplus of the public sector.
If all public sector assets and liabilities earned the same expected cash
rate of return as that used in the present value calculations (i.e. rg+j), then the
last two terms on the r.h.s. of (4.8) vanish. If —w,thenet of depreciation
cash rate of return on public sector capital, exceeds ,themarginal cost of
domestic borrowing, then smaller primary current surpluses and/or less
seigniorage are required to achieve solvency. A value of in excess of —
worsensthe solvency of the government.
The secondterm on the r.h.s. of equation (4.8) allows for differences
between internal and external borrowing rates. Clearly if the expected real rate
of return on domestic debt exceeds that on foreign debt (1 + >(1 +r5)
(1 +
orequivalently if I + > (1+i)(1
+ thenswitching from22
domestic debt to foreign debt (either through an open—market operation today or by
switchingthe future internal—external financing mix towards external borrowing)
will strengthen the solvency of the govenunent. Of course such an operation may
notbe feasible say because the foreign interest rate does not represent the
marginal cost of increased external borrowing. This will e.g. be the case if there
is external credit rationing.
The final option open to the government to restore its solvency without
repudiation is to increase the present value of future seigniorage. Seigniornge
can be written in a number of equivalent ways:
Al Alt
(4.9)
1 1__________________ +(! + rj_j) (1 + st—i) — 'II' + (1 +
Hereindenotes base moneyper unitof GOP.
The first of the three expressions on the r.h.s. of (4.9) emphasizes the real
resources appropriated by the government in period 2 by running the printing
presses. The second breaks down total seigniorage revenue as the product of a
"seignioragetaxrate"a p and a "seigniorage taxbase"ina thereciprocal
of the income velocity of circulation of base money. The third expresses the value
ofthe resources extracted by the government as the sumof the increase in the stock
of money per unit of output Am2 and the change in the money output ratio that would
have occurred with a constant nominal money stock because of inflation and real
output growth (approximately (T2.1+ n2_1)m21).Some authors reserve the term
"inflation tax" for r21m2.1 ,butwe shall use the terms seigniorage and
inflation tax interchangeably.
In steady state we assume that
(4.10) i÷p=(i+n)(i+r)23
Ve wish to investigate the relationship between ,theamount of
seigniorage the government wishes to extract, and the rate of inflation. This
requires a model of the demand for base money. Base money is the sum of currency CII
and commercial bank reserves 115 i.e. 1= (5+ 115.
For the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to work with an aggregate
demand for base money function which is not "built up" from its constituent
components CII and 115 .Usingannual data from 1960/ 61 to 1986/87, we estimated a
base money demand equation in velocity form. V is the ratio of GNP to the monetary





+T) .Theresult is given in equation (4.11).




(3.151) (—2.082) (2.422) (—3.075) (2.545)
12 =0.65; SI =0.32; f(4,20) =9.15(0.0002) ; DV =2.21.Conventionally
calculated t statistics are given in brackets below the coefficient estimates. SI
is the equation standard error. The probability value for the F test whose null is
that the population 12 is zero is 0.0002. The LI test for autocorrelated residuals
(from lags 1 to 3) gives Chi2(3) =1.07.The F—form suggested by Harvey [1981]
gives F(3, 17) =0.25.There is therefore no evidence of residual autocorrelation.
White's [1980] test for heteroskedasticity gives F(8, 11) =0.83.The Chi2 test
for normality of the residuals yields Chi2(2) =9•94•7
The estimated equation suggests that a higher rate of inflation raises
velocity (reduces the demand for base money): A possible interpretation of the
last two terms on the r.h.s. of equation (4.11) is that positive deviations of
output from trend are associated with reductions in velocity.
Inferences about the long—run rate of inflation implied by the need for
seigniorage revenue are most easily made when the money demand or velocity24
equation has a steady state. Equation (4.11) almost qualifies. In steady state
output grows at the constant proportional rate n. Over the sample period the mean
growth rate of real output is 0.054. The last two terms on the r.h.s. of equation
(4.11) caninsteady state be written as: —6.850ln)' —6.B5Oni+O.188i.Vhile
the two opposing trends don't quite cancel each other out when n =0.054,a
reasonable first approximation would permit us to evaluate long—run velocity by
ignoring the offsetting time trends. This yields the long—run velocity equation:
(4.12a) V= 6.165+ 15.782T
Alternatively we canevaluateboth mY andiat their sample means. This yields
(4.12b) V= 6.512+ 15.782i
In what follows we work with the numerical estimates given in equation
(4.12b).
Steady—state seigniorage as a proportion of GNP is, from equation (4.9),
given by
(4.13) =[(I+)(1+n)—1] y1
Unlike the long—run money demand functions that have
(1 +n(1+i) or
ln[(l +n)(1+f)] linear
in i, thelong—run base money demand function we have
estimated does not have a long—run seigniorage Laffer curve. Across steady states
seigniorage increases with the rate of inflation as long as 9.47n <6.512.The
reason is (speaking somewhat loosely) that the elasticity of long—nm money demand
(1 +n)(1+r)
with respect to the inflation rate is less than unity in absolute
value for all inflation rates A greater need for long—run seigniorage therefore
unambiguously implies a higher lofig—run rate of inflation:
— n—6.SlIq
15.782q —(1 + n)25
To get a sense of the magnitude of the correction in x =—ö+ ,thesum of
the augmented primary surplus and seigniorage, we calculate what constant value of
z would stabilize the debt—GNP ratio at some given value d for given constant
values of the real interest rate net of the growth rate r —n.Sincez =(r—n)d
the figures in Table 12 follow immediately.
The actual value of in 1985/6 was —5.5 percent of GNP(seeTable 4). It
reached —7.1 percent of GNP in 1986/7. Even in the optimistic case in which d is
stabilized at its 1986/87 value of just over 50 percent of GNP and the interest rate
exceeds the growth rate by only one percentage point, x1 would have to be raised by
between 6.0 and 7.6 percentage points of GNP permanently.
If the debt—GNP ratio is not stabilized until it reaches some higher level or
if the long—run growth rate of GNP falls short of the long—run real interest rate
by more than one percentage point, the required permanent fiscal or seigniorage
correction can be considerably higher.
the maximal steady—state seigniorage that can be extracted given our
estimate of the money demand function, is given by= = 15782
.Witha four
percent long—run real growth rate, 0.066 that is 6.6 percent of GNP. This
amount of seigniorage will only be extracted in the limit as the rate of inflation
goes to infinity.Without a reduction in the augmented primary deficit,
stabilizing the debt—GNP ratio at 50 percent through increased use of seigniorage
alone will not be possible even when the excess of the interest rate over the growth
rate is only one percentage point. In that case seigniorage would have to be raised
by between 6.0 and 7.6 percent of GM' to 8.70 or 10.30 percent of GM'. The
nonexistence of equilibrium in this case suggests the possibility of a
hyperinflation.26
The steady—state inflation rate implied by a continuation of the current
share of seigniorage in CNP (2.7 percent, and therefore a reduction in the primary
deficit of between 6.0 and 7.6 percent of GNP) would, with a four percent long—run
real growth rate of CNP, be 21.2 percent per year. Lowering the long—nm share of
seigniorage in GM' to one percent would, with a four percent long—run real growth
rate, reduce the long—run inflation rate to 2.6 percent per annum. Raising the
state—state share of seigniorage in GM' to four percent would, with a four percent
real growth rate, imply a long—nm rate of inflation of 52.0 percent per year.
These figures should of course be taken with a fairly substantial pinch of salt.
Our demand function for base money leaves much to be desired. We offer it as an
illustration of a methodology that we believe to be useful. Further empirical
refinement is necessary before confident statements can be made about the
trade—off s faced by India's policy makers.
The seigniorage concept analyzed here can be referred to as one component of
the anticipated inflation tax. Anticipated inflation may also have effects on the
primary deficit. A tax system that incorporates nominal progression will, with
any positive rate of inflation, yield increased real tax rewenues if the tax
brackets are not fully index—linked. This "fiscal drag" has been argued to be
dominated at high rates of inflation by the negative effect on real tax collections
of delayed payment of taxes and inadequate interest penalties for late payment.
This Tanzi effect (Tanzi [1978]) is further complicated through the existence of
nominal specific taxes and tariffs, nominal cash limits on spending etc.
If the government has long—dated fixed interest debt outstanding which is
denominated in domestic currency, then an unanticipated increase in the rate of
inflation will act as an unanticipated capital levy on such assets. This can be
viewed as a de facto repudiation of part of the public debt. Even with domestic
currency denominated short maturity debt or long—dated but variable interest27
debt, an unexpected capital levy ca-n be imposed if an unexpected increase in the
general price level can be engineered. In a very open economy this can be achieved
through a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate, but in the case of India the
very limited openness of the economy prevents this f rot being a practical policy
option.
Like formal repudiation, de facto repudiation through a deliberately
engineered unexpected reduction in the market value of the public debt is a serious
policy option that should be considered along with policy measures for reducing
the primary deficit and along with the increased use of seigniorage. Long—dated
public debt, even when index—linked (which is not the case in India), and to a
lesser extent short—dated debt is already "contingent debt", even in the absence
of repudiation risk:its real value can change, both in anticipated and
unanticipated ways, because of a whole range of shocks that have not been
engineered deliberately or accidentally by the policy makers.
One of the likely consequences of (partial) repudiation, (as of a capital
levy on bond holders or a decline in the market value of long—dated debt due to an
unexpected increase in the rate of inflation) is to add a risk premium to the
interest rate the government must pay on new debt issues. In extreme cases the
government might, for a while, not be able to issue any new debt at all. These
costs have to be balanced against the cost of reducing the primary deficit and of
making increased use of seigniorage. There is no general case, in equity or
efficiency, for exempting the owners of public debt from sharing the burden of
adjustment to unforeseen contingencies in preference to owners of human capital,
physical capital or land and in preference to the beneficiaries of public
spending.28
5. CONCLUSION
Thestatistical solvency tests and the estimated demand for base money
function suggest two conclusions.First continuation of recent patterns of
behavior will eventually threaten the solvency of the government. Second the
option of using the inflation tax to close part of the budgetary gap appears to be a
limited option indeed. Small increases in the share of seigniorage in GNP will
have a high cost in terms of additional long—run inflation and even maximal use of
the inflation tax will not be sufficient to close the solvency gap.
The first of these conclusions does not stand or fall with our formal tests
for solvency. Visual inspection of Figures 1 and 2, and Tables 1 and 4 make it
abundantly clear that the fiscal situation is perilous. It is primarily the rapid
increase in the internal public debt that signals the crisis to come.
Unless measures to reduce the primary deficit are taken, a fiscal crisis is
bound to come. Where and when it will strike cannot be predicted with certainty.
Often a fiscal crisis first manifests itself in the foreign exchanges. Actual or
imminent international reserve exhaustion is a common trigger for emergency
measures including recourse to Ill standby financing and the conditionality this
implies. Such foreign exchange crises can happen even if, as in the case of India,
the external debt burden of the country is quite modest.
The fiscal retrenchment that appears to be required is large and will be
painful. The political and economic challenge is to implement the required
combination of spending cuts, and of tax and other revenue increases in a way that
does least damage to the economy's growth prospects, and that protects the weakest
and poorest citizens.29
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1.Report of the Committee to Review the Working of the lonetary System,
April 1985, B.BI, Bombay.
2.India, Bureau of Public Enterprises, Public Enterprises Survey: Annual
Report on the Working of Industrial andCommercialUndertakings of the
Central Government, Volumes for 1970/1 to 1986/7.
3.Report on Currency andFinance, IWI,Volumes for 1977/8—1987/8.
4.Economic Survey, Government of India, 1988/9.
5.World Debt Tables: External Debt of Developing Countries, 1988/9,
VolumesII and III, Country Tables, Washington, DC.
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES:
NTD a NTDD +NTFD(see notes to Tables 2 and 3)
35TABLE 2:DOIESTIC PRIVATE HOLDINGS OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, STATE AND
PuBLIC ENTERPRISELIABILITIES,1970/1—1986/7 (X OF CNP)























































































1.Report of the Committee to Review the Working of the Monetary System,
April 1985, RBI, Bombay.
2. India, Bureau of Public Enterprises, Public Enterprises Survey Annual
Report on the Working of Industrial and Commercial Undertakings of the
Central Government, Volumes for 1970/1—1986/7.
3.Report on Currency and Finance, RBI, Volumes for 1977/8—1987/8.
4.Economic Survey, Government of India, 1988/9.
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES:
NTDDCDD+SDD+PEDD.
CDD:Internal debt of Central Government except special securities issued to
theReserve Bank of India, Treasury bills issued to the Reserve Bank of
Indiaandto State Governments; plus Small Savings Scheme; plus
Five—Year Time Deposits; plus Provident Funds etc; minus loans and
debentures to Public Enterprises.
SDD:Internal debt of State Governments less Ways and Means Advances from
the Reserve Bank of India; plus Provident Funds; less loans to Public
Enterprises.
PEDD: Rupee denominated debt of Public Enterprises not held by Central
Government or States.
36TABLE 3: FOREIGN LIABILITIES AND ASSETS OF THE




































































1.World Debt Tables: External Debt of Developing Countries, 1988/9,
Volumes II and III, Country Tables, Washington, DC.
2.Economic Survey, Government of India, 1988/9.
DEFINITIONSOF VARIABLES:
NTFD a TFD —R.
TFD:Public andPubliclyGuaranteed Long—Term debt plus use of hf Credit
plusimputed Short—Term Public Debt
R: Official foreign exchange reserves plus SDRs.
*
Weassumed that the Public Sector's share of total short—term external debt
was the same as its share of total long—term debt.
Note: External debt data in World Debt Tables is on a calendar year basis.
The figures in Tables 1 and 3 "apportion" the calendar year figures to
financialyears (April 1to larch 31) e.g. the figure for financial year
1986/7is three—quarters of the calendar year 1986 figureplus one—quarter of
thecalendar year 1987 figure.
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TABLE 4: THE PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICIT, ITS COIPONENTS
Aim SEIGNIORAGE, 1970/1—1986/7 (7 OF GNP)
PRIIARY INTEREST
DEFICIT DEFICIT PAYMENTS SEIGNIOLAGE
1.9 1.1 1970/71 5.8 3.9
1971/72 7.3 5.3 2.0 1.1
1972/73 6.9 5.0 1.9 1.0
1973/74 5.6 3.9 1.7 2.2
1974/75 5.9 4.2 1.7 0.7
1975/76 6.7 4.7 2.0 0.3
1976/77 7.1 4.8 2.3 1.4
1977/78 6.9 4.9 2.0 1.9
1978/79 7.9 5.6 2.3 2.2
1979/80 8.3 5.7 2.6 2.8
1980/81 10.0 7.6 2.4 1.7
1981/82 9.6 6.9 2.7 1.7
1982/83 10.7 7.8 2.9 2.2
1983/84 10.7 7.7 3.0 3.1












1.Economic Survey, Government of India, Volumes 1972/3—1988/9.
2.Report on Currency andFinance,821, Volumes 1980/1—1987/8.
3. Statistical Appendix: Supplement to the 1(21OccasionalPapers, Volume
3(1), June 1982, Monetary Policy in India: Issues andEvidence.TABLE 5: SELECTED ECONOUC INDICATORS
39
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GrowthGNP X
%A in
GDP Deflator%A inCPI Ex.
Deprec.
late 7
1970/71 6.15 2.99 4.19 0.0
1971/72 2.14 5.43 5.36 0.32
1972/73 —0.54 11.00 11.44 2.74
1973/74 3.74 18.89 27.00 1.72
1974/75 0.20 17.97 16.77 1.44
1975/76 9.67 —2.87 —10.77 8.49
1976/77 1.61 6.59 8.91 3.29
1977/78 8.37 3.41 2.90 —4.20
1978/79 6.71 2.06 3.59 —4.17
1979/80 —4.51 15.56 12.13 —1.58
1980/81 6.48 18.71 12.58 —2.27
1981/82 6.48 10.01 8.82 13.13
1982/83 3.47 7.23 9.91 7.88
1983/84 7.61 8.36 11.15 7.05
1984/85 3.20 7.14 5.01 15.27
1985/86 6.11 7.53 8.85 2.90







































































































1.Columns (1) and (2):IMF, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook,
1989, Washington, DC.
2.Column (3): Economic Survey, Government of India, Volumes
1969/70—1987/8.
3.Column (4): IKF, International Financial Statistics (IFS), Ionthly,
1970—1988, Washington, DC.
4.Column (5): Report on Currency andFinance,RBI, Volumes for
1970/1—1987/8.
5.Column(6):Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, Ionthly, Volumes for
1970/1—1987/8.
6.Columns(7)and(8): WorldDebt Tables: External Debt of Developin
Countries,1988/9, Volumes II and III,Country Tables, Washington, D42
*
TABLE 6: DISCOUNTED DEBT, PRIIARY DEFICIT ANI) SEIGNIURACE, 1970/1—1986/7
(current Rupees discounted to 1970/1)
Discounted using the Long—Term Government Bond Yield.
SOURCES:




1542 1970/71 14887 426
1971/72 15660 2118 451
1972/73 16966 2083 433
1973/74 17162 1924 1063
1974/75 18668 2283 3788
1975/76 18909 2580 185
1976/77 19644 2652 793









1980/81 22529 5231 1160
1981/82 27065 5167 1257
1982/83 31955 6022 1695
1983/84 34834 6500 2594
1984/85 38820 7923 1115
1985/86 47045 7980 2655
1986/87 51427 9618 263643









Thesecritical values are for sample
the critical values appropriate to the
rejection of the null.
B1
is the debt measured in Rupees discounted at the Long—Term Government
Bond yield.
B2 is the debt measured in Rupees discounted at the average advance rate.
is the debt measured in U.S. dollars discounted at the foreign all
creditors dollar interest rate.
is the debt measured in U.S. dollars discounted at the foreign official









size 25. Our sample size is 17. Using




























*Stdarderrors are given in brackets below coefficientestimates.





Values (997.)—22.5 —4.38 10.61
*
Thesecritical values are for sample size 25, (see Table 7).
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TABLE 10:UNIT ROUT TESTS FORNTD/CNP AND I
fl)') +,)
NTD/GNP 0.04 0.02 5.08
*
X —12.89 —3.16 4.39
Critical(957.)—17.9 —3.60 7.24
**
Values (997.)—22.5 —4.38 10.61
tThe discount rate used is the yield on long—term government securities.









x —2681.56 —298.68 0.18
(9246.76) (101.84) (0.26)
Standarderrors are given in brackets below coefficient estimates.TABLE 12: DEBT—GKP
PLUS
RATIO STABILIZING TALlIES OF SEIGNIOUGE
AUGIENTED PUlLEY SURPLUS
d 507. 757. 100%
7.—n
17. 0.57, 0.757. 1.07.
2 1.0 1.5 2.0
3 1.5 2.25 3.0
48